Regulatory heterogeneity as obstacle for international services trade by Henk Kox & Arjan Lejour





Regulatory heterogeneity as obstacle for 
international services trade  
 
Henk Kox, Arjan Lejour 
 
The responsibility for the contents of this CPB Discussion Paper remains with the author(s) 
 CPB Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis 
Van Stolkweg 14 
P.O. Box 80510 
2508 GM  The Hague, the Netherlands 
 
Telephone  +31 70 338 33 80 
Telefax  +31 70 338 33 50 






ISBN 90-5833-237-3    3 
Abstract in English 
International trade in services is hampered by non-tariff barriers that originate from national 
regulations. Not only the level of regulation in home or export country matters, but also the 
inter-country differences in regulation for service markets. Regulatory measures tend to affect 
fixed costs rather than variable costs. The fact that regulations often differ by market, means 
that the fixed costs of complying with regulations in an export market are in fact sunk market-
entry costs. We prove that policy heterogeneity between countries has a negative impact on 
bilateral service trade. We develop a new index of bilateral policy heterogeneity, and apply it in 
a gravity model for explaining service trade among EU countries. The empirical results support 
our theoretical prediction: the degree of regulatory heterogeneity is inversely related to the level 
of bilateral service trade. Simulations for the EU show that if countries make more use of 
mutual recognition, bilateral trade in commercial services among EU countries could increase 
by 30% to 60%.  
Key words: services trade, regulatory barriers, policy heterogeneity, internal market EU 
 
Abstract in Dutch 
De internationale handel in diensten wordt gehinderd door nationale verschillen in 
marktregulering. De kwalificatie-eisen die aan buitenlandse dienstenaanbieders gesteld worden 
verhogen de vaste kosten van deze ondernemingen. Bovendien, omdat de eisen per land 
verschillen, gaat het vaak om verzonken kosten van markttoetreding. We tonen aan dat de 
heterogeniteit in regulering de intra-Europese bilaterale dienstenhandel negatief beïnvloedt. Een 
speciaal daartoe ontwikkelde indicator voor bilaterale heterogeniteit in marktregulering is 
toegepast in een graviteitsmodel. De empirische resultaten komen overeen met het voorspelde 
patroon: de heterogeniteit in regulering hindert de bilaterale handel in diensten tussen EU-
landen. Simulaties met deze resultaten tonen dat de intra-EU dienstenhandel met 30% tot 60% 
kan toenemen wanneer landen meer gebruik maken van wederzijdse erkenning van 
reguleringsnormen.  
 
Trefwoorden: dienstenhandel, reguleringsbarrières, beleidsheterogeniteit, interne markt EU 
 
Een uitgebreide Nederlandse samenvatting is beschikbaar via www.cpb.nl.   4   5 
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Summary 
Service providers often experience obstacles when they want to export their services to other 
countries. To an important degree, such trade barriers result from national regulations for 
service firms or service products. This affects service firms more than manufacturing firms, 
because the service provider often has to provide his services close to the foreign consumer. 
Non-tariff barriers for service markets have mostly been analysed as if they were tariffs, i.e. a 
volume-proportional cost mark-up at the border. This approach may well be flawed for a 
substantial part of international services trade.  
Foreign service providers are confronted by national regulations such as requirements for 
additional professional qualifications, local residence of management, additional professional 
insurance, and constraints on the use of inputs from their origin country. Qualifications acquired 
in other countries where it operates, are often not recognised or supported. To the extent that 
regulations differ between countries, the fixed costs associated with such regulations are sunk 
market-entry costs, specific for a particular export market. The service provider has to decide 
whether or not to "invest" in such fixed market-entry costs. Hence, bilateral policy 
heterogeneity between countries acts as a trade barrier. In relative terms, the strongest effect of 
policy heterogeneity falls upon small- and medium-sized service firms, because the border-
related qualification costs often are independent of firm size. We show in a formal model that 
policy heterogeneity negatively affects the level of bilateral services trade.  
In order to test this model, we developed a new index of bilateral policy heterogeneity 
between countries, based on detailed pair-wise country comparisons with respect to a large 
number of regulation items that affect service markets. The heterogeneity index is also 
decomposed for five different policy areas (barriers to competition; administrative barriers for 
start-ups; regulatory and administrative opacity; explicit barriers to trade and investment; and 
state control). The disaggregation makes it possible to test in which policy areas the 
international regulatory heterogeneity has its largest trade impacts. 
Our hypotheses are tested empirically with regard to service trade among EU countries. The 
level of bilateral trade in commercial services is explained in a gravity model that - apart from 
the policy-heterogeneity indices - uses the following explanatory variables: GDP in the country 
of origin and destination (indicator for market size and scale effects), indicators for physical and 
language distance between countries (representing variable trade costs), OECD indicators for 
relative regulatory intensity of countries. The empirical results are in line with our hypotheses. 
A high level of policy heterogeneity between two countries has a significant negative effect on 
bilateral service trade. The results prove to be robust for various specifications and estimation 
methods.  
These results are important from a policy perspective. Reducing the trade-hampering effects 
of international regulatory heterogeneity can be done in two ways: harmonising regulations or 
applying mutual recognition of (foreign) regulatory standards. The second form requires much   8 
less coordination and could perhaps be more easily achieved. Under mutual recognition, foreign 
firms may operate in an export market if they comply with regulatory standards in their origin 
country. It reduces the fixed market-entry costs in export markets. It would generate more trade 
participation of small- and medium-sized firms, while larger firms may get more scope for 
exploiting scale-related efficiency gains.  
Our results have been used for simulations of recent EU proposals that allow for more 
mutual recognition of regulatory standards in European services markets. A key element in 
these proposals is the 'country of origin' principle: a service provider that meets the standards 
set by regulation in his country of origin may no longer be confronted by additional regulation 
in the EU country where the service is delivered. Using our earlier empirical results we 
performed simulations on the basis of the recent EU proposals. The simulations show that full 
implementation of these measures could have a very powerful impact on trade: an increase in 
intra-European commercial services trade by 30% to 60%.  
   9 
1  Introduction
1 
The paper analyses how national product-market regulations function as non-tariff barriers in 
international services trade, and how changes in regulation could affect services trade. 
Government regulation has a strong impact on international services trade. There are several 
reasons for that. Such regulation is sometimes motivated by protectionism, but more often 
applies to domestic producers as well. Product-market regulation is motivated by market 
failures like information asymmetry, externalities (e.g. safety aspects of building design), or 
monopolist positions. Service consumers tend to have more a priori uncertainty about product 
quality than holds for buyers of manufacturing goods. The information asymmetry can be 
serious for complex professional services using specialist knowledge inputs (e.g. medical 
services). These issues at least partly explain why there is such a long history of government-
imposed regulations, operational restrictions, and market entry barriers for suppliers of 
services.
2  
Many services can only be delivered through local presence of the service provider. In the 
case of merchandise trade the national border is crossed by the goods themselves. Services trade 
is more 'international' in the sense that the provider himself, his staff, his equipment and 
material may need to cross the border. Some or all stages of the business process take place in 
the country where the service is provided, thus becoming subject to national regulatory 
intervention in the export destination country. Each national authority uses its own system of 
quality safeguards and regulatory standards for service providers. Service exporters are thus 
confronted with different regulations and requirements in each destination country. Because of 
the country-specific character of regulations, service exporters incur sunk market-entry costs for 
each export market. 
The structure of the paper is the following. Section 2 discusses the types of NTBs that affect 
international services trade. Regulatory non-tariff barriers typically have an impact upon fixed 
costs, and function as market entry barriers. In Section 3 we analyse formally in a monopolistic-
competition model how international regulatory heterogeneity affects services trade. Before 
being able to test the theoretical predictions we had to develop an appropriate index for bilateral 
policy heterogeneity. Section 4 briefly describes our new indicator for bilateral regulatory 
heterogeneity between countries. Section 5 empirically tests the heterogeneity impact on 
bilateral trade in a gravity analysis of bilateral service trade among EU countries. The 
 
1 In writing this paper, we have benefited from the insights and comments by Theo van de Klundert, and our CPB colleagues 
Marcel Canoy, Richard Nahuis, and George Gelauff. Helpful were also the comments by participants of several seminars 
where earlier versions of this paper have been presented. All remaining flaws are ours. 
2 Quality-inspired regulations have, for instance, since ancient times been applied to the medical profession. The regulations 
formed one of the sources of the medieval guild system. The Royal College of Physicians of London received its charter in 
1518 and got a monopoly over the practicing medicine in London, and the oversight of physicians throughout England. 
Fellows of the College were not allowed to engage in trade, practice surgery or compound or sell medicines. These 'pure 
physicians' were limited to examining patients, diagnosing disease, and prescribing (but not dispensing) medications (Carr-
Saunders and Wilson, 1993).    10 
heterogeneity in regulation does indeed turn out to play a significant role. Section 6 brings 
together the most important conclusions. It also illustrates the policy relevance of our findings 
by using them to simulate the trade effects of recent EU proposals that will reduce the intra-EU 
heterogeneity in regulation. Even though the proposals only partially eradicate the impact of 
policy differences in services markets, we find that the proposals may very substantially raise 
bilateral services trade in the European Union.    11 
2  Non-tariff barriers in services trade 
The variety in non-tariff barriers (NTBs) for international trade in services NTBs is large, so 
that some taxonomy must precede a discussion of their quantitative impact. Hoekman and 
Primo Braga (1997) distinguish several types of NTBs. The first group consists of quantitative-
restrictive policies. An example are the bilateral agreements for air transportation services. 
Some countries do not allow foreign providers to operate in particular services industries. A 
variation on this restrictiveness theme is formed by discriminatory access to distribution 
networks like railways, cable networks, telephone system, and electricity distribution.
3 A 
second group of NTBs consists of price-based policies, such as price controls for specific 
services (e.g. banking, insurance and telecommunication), or prices that discriminate between 
foreign origins or destinations (e.g. visa fees, entry or exit taxes, and post taxes). A third and 
very large group of NTBs is formed by licences, qualification and certification requirements, 
and operational restrictions for foreign services providers.  
 
Some NTBs are obviously discriminatory for foreign service providers. Limited or denied 
access to distribution and communication networks is an example for that. The same holds for 
quantity restrictions or price-based policies. The third group (regulatory requirements) is, 
however, different. The simple fact that service providers have to meet regulatory standards is 
not in itself a trade barrier. Both domestic and foreign providers have to comply with such 
regulations. National regulatory standards can therefore be fully compatible with WTO 
principles of non-discrimination. The trade-hampering effect of these standards results from a 
systematic disregard by national governments for the fact that service providers more often than 
not have already qualified themselves in other countries. Service providers thus face additional 
regulation-compliance costs. The regulatory requirements come on top of regulatory 
qualifications that are already complied with in the home market and in other countries where 
the service firm operates. Such duplication of regulations creates a negative trade effect ('border 
effect').  
Measurement of NTB-related trade costs 
Various quantification approaches have been applied to estimate the trade-cost impact of 
NTBs.
4 Mostly used are frequency measures, price-based measures, and quantity-based 
measures. 
Frequency measures use an inventory approach. The frequency index may be based on the 
percentage of rules that are established as discriminatory for foreign firms. Hoekman (1995) did 
a first comprehensive attempt in this line of research. The resulting frequency indices cannot be 
interpreted as tariff equivalents, as Brown and Stern (2001) show in their survey. 
 
3 Hoekman and Primo Braga (1997) classify this as a separate group. 
4 Cf. surveys by Deardorff and Stern (1998); Anderson and van Wincoop (2004); Messerlin (2001).   12 
Price-based measures calculate the price or cost effect of the non-tariff barrier. This has been 
done for banking and maritime services (cf. Findlay and Warren, 2000). The tariff equivalent of 
the NTB can be calculated straightforwardly from its price effect.  
Quantity-based measures often are derived by interpreting the effects of the non-tariff 
barriers as a "lacking trade” volume, compared to some counterfactual. The trade-volume effect 
of NTBs can be derived using gravity equations. Given the demand elasticity, the volume effect 
can subsequently be translated into a tariff equivalent. Anderson and Van Wincoop (2004) 
survey many studies using this approach. 
All three methods have their drawbacks. Quite often the methods do not isolate the effects 
of the NTB from other trade-affecting factors, or trade measurement imperfections. NTB-
frequency indices inevitably require arbitrary judgments by the researchers with regard to the 
categorisation of measures by the criterion of their discrimination for foreign firms. The 
empirical results often show that NTBs are higher for developing countries than for the 
developed ones. In less-regulated countries, the NTBs are also lower.
5 
Variable costs versus fixed costs 
The tariff equivalents derived from price measures and quantity-based estimates implicitly 
assume that the NTBs affect variable trade costs. This makes sense for merchandise (goods) 
trade. There it holds that most border-related costs -like currency exchange, language and 
security costs- are in some way related to the trade volume, even though perhaps some trading 
costs like information costs can be interpreted as volume-independent.
6 This is different for 
services. NTBs that affect the service exporter's variable costs just form a sub-set of all NTBs 
for service markets. This is illustrated in Table 2.1. Many trade barriers stem from national 
measures that primarily affect fixed costs of the service providers. Licences, qualification and 
certification requirements, and operational restrictions for (foreign) services providers tend to 
be one-off costs. The foreign service provider has to fulfil these requirements before entering 
the market, but the effort and costs to fulfil them are often not related to the trade volume  
 
Recent literature
7 has modelled the export decisions of manufacturing firms as a kind of 
investment decision with sunk costs. Firms do not only face per-unit costs such as transport 
costs, but also fixed costs that do not vary with the export volume. Melitz (2003) argues that 
firms have to find and inform foreign buyers about their products, establish distribution 
channels, and adapt their products to the standards of that national market. Firms also have to 
learn the regulatory environment.  
 
5 The estimates of NTBs in services range from a few percent of the import value to ten percent, or in some cases even 
hundred percent, such as in some transport services (e.g. Hoekman 1995; Findlay and Warren, 2000). 
6 This does not necessarily imply that these costs are linear in the volume of trade. But these are certainly no fixed costs. It 
is very likely, that NTBs per unit of trade volume are lower for high volumes of trade. 
7 Examples are Bernard and Jensen (1999); Roberts and Tybout (1997); Melitz (2003); Baldwin (2005). Some of their 
arguments are already proposed by Baldwin and Krugman (1989).   13 
Table 2.1  National product-market regulations for services markets 
a)
 









         
Restrictions on import quantity (entry prohibition, local content 
requirements, restricted network access)  
      X 
         
Controlled import prices (reference, minimum or maximum price)      X   
         
Market access costs related to import volume (entry or exit taxes, visa 
costs, differentiated tariffs by firm origin, postal tariffs)  
  X 
   
         
Firm start-up licenses and associated authorisation requirements  X       
         
Service-providing personnel must have locally recognised professional 
qualifications (may necessitate re-qualification) 
X 
     
         
Obligatory membership of local professional association  X       
         
Juridical requirements (owners or managers of service-providing firm 
must have local residence or nationality, firms must have a specific 
legal form) 
X 
     
         
Requirement that service providers have nationally recognised liability 
insurance or professional indemnity insurance. 
X 
     
         
All service activities in export destination country fully subject to 
regular administrative and tax procedures 
X 
     
         
Limitations on inter-professional co-operation or on the variety of 
services provided by one firm (may require unbundling) 
X 
     
         
Temporary service personnel from origin country fully subject to rules 
of the social security system of the destination country 
X 
     
         
Impediments for material inputs, suppliers and personnel from origin 
country (may require a search for new local suppliers) 
X 
     
          a) 
This table is for illustrative purposes. Studies that assess the relative frequency or incidence of the different types of regulatory trade 
barriers in this table are still lacking, or only cover a limited number of countries. 
 
The existence of fixed market entry costs is confirmed in interviews with managers, but there 
are no statistics on the magnitude of these costs. Melitz (2003) and Roberts and Tybout (1997) 
find evidence that the decision of firms to export to a particular market is positively affected by 
the firms' export size in the previous period to that market. This could be explained by the 
existence of fixed market-entry costs.
8  
For studying the trade effect of regulatory asymmetries across countries it is useful to have a 
look at their 'counterpart' in manufacturing trade, i.e. the so-called technical barriers to trade. 
Brenton and Vancauteren (2001) and Chen (2004) find that the border effect in intra-European 
 
8 Roberts and Tybout (1997) find evidence that manufacturing firms incur sunk costs for exporting  (information costs, 
establishing brand name, setting up distribution network), and that the sunk costs involved indeed give rise to tractable 
hysteresis effects in entry and exit behaviour in export markets. Once having made the investment in sunk costs, firms will 
postpone exiting even if market and profit developments are unfavourable.   14 
manufacturing trade is largest in those sectors where technical barriers to trade are most 
important. According to the first two authors, the 'border effect is smallest in those 
manufacturing sectors where European member states apply mutual recognition of national 
product standards.
9 Turrini and Van Ypersele (2002) demonstrate that asymmetries in national 
law systems can also have a negative trade effect, because these asymmetries create additional 
transaction costs for international trade. This is confirmed - also for manufacturing- by the 
empirical results of Sousa and Disdier (2002).  
To our knowledge, no study has so far investigated the implications of fixed and sunk export 
costs for international trade in services, although scattered evidence suggest that there is reason 
enough for doing this. In a survey among a large number of business-service firms in the EU 
78 per cent of the responding firms mention that setup costs of selling services in other EU 
states are "significant" or “very significant” trading barriers (CSES 2001:190).
10 The setup-cost 
effects are largest for small and medium-sized enterprises (SME). The European Commission 
(2001) states: "Evidence collected from SME’s and SME-supporting organisations suggests that 
many SME’s back off after initial inquiries about administrative requirements and procedures 
because they feel they do not have the necessary resources to deal with the current complexity".  
 
The evidence suggests that - rather than considering service-trade NTBs as quasi-tariffs, as has 
been done mostly till now- it makes sense to investigate the trade impacts of fixed market-entry 
costs. We set out to do so. 
 
9 Brenton and Vancauteren (2001) consider the presence of significant 'border effects' in sectors where technical barriers 
are not important, as an indication that home-market preferences play a role as well.
  Head and Mayer (2000) draw a similar 
conclusion with regard to intra-EU manufacturing trade. 
10 Of those firms that were able to estimate the size of the setup costs, 30 per cent estimated that these are in the order of 3-
6 months sales proceeds, and 43 per cent estimated that the cost are more than 6 months of sales proceeds (CSES 2001: 
191).   15 
3  Modelling the trade impact of policy heterogeneity 
Intuition suggests that international regulation differences work out negatively on international 
services trade. We show on the basis of a model characterised by monopolistic competition and 
fixed costs that this is indeed the case. Differentiated services products are imperfect substitutes 
for each other. In the model we assume that trans-border services trade is demand-driven rather 
than cost-driven. International policy heterogeneity is reflected in the structure of fixed setup 
costs for service firms. We investigate the impact of policy heterogeneity on the variety and size 
of bilateral service trade.  
 
Consumer utility increases in the quantity and variety of services products. The preference for 
variety implies that they derive a higher utility from spending their income on m service 
varieties than from spending it on m-1 service varieties. It does not matter whether the varieties 
are produced domestically or imported; there is no home bias in preferences. The utility of the 
representative consumer in country j is framed as a CES-utility function à la Dixit-Stiglitz: 






























  (3.1)  
in which vij X represents the consumption in country j of the variety produced by firm v from 
country i. The substitution elasticity σ is constant and identical over the entire range of 
varieties. Each services firm produces one variety, which is sold on the domestic and the 
foreign markets. The number of varieties and firms (nij) is endogenous. The budget constraint of 
















  (3.2) 
where j Y  represents real income in country j, vij P is the consumer price in country j of variety v 
produced in country i, and j P is the aggregate price index of services in country j. The latter is a 
'true' price index, indicating the price of one unit of the composite services bundle given that the 


























1   (3.3)   16 
The assumptions imply a strong taste and decision symmetry for consumers across countries. 
Assuming utility maximisation this makes it possible to derive the implicit demand curve in 
country j as perceived by the individual firm v from country i: 

















  (3.4) 
Each firm uses labour as only production input. Wage rates wi and variable labour requirements 
(αi) are exogenous and identical across countries, so that country suffices are suppressed 
henceforth. Production is subject to economies of scale. Apart from variable labour 
requirements, firms incur fixed labour costs for complying with government-imposed 
qualification criteria. Government requirements differ by country, which implies that foreign 
firms in each export market face country-specific qualification costs. The country-specific fixed 
costs are expressed as a fraction hij (hij >0) of fixed qualification costs in the firm’s home 
country (Fi). Hence, whij Fi  represents the costs of policy heterogeneity. Firms have the same 
cost structure:  
( ) 1 ; 0 ; , = > " + = ii ij i ij vij vij h h with j i v F h X w C a   3.5) 
Profits at each market are described by: 




, , ) ( " - - = a p   (3.6) 
The imperfect substitutability of each service variety means that markets are to some extent 
segmented. When the number of firms is large enough, individual firms ignore the effects of 
their own action on the aggregate price. The profit-maximising price (denoted by an asterisk) 







b a b with j i v w Pvij   (3.7) 
The term b represents the gross mark-up of price over marginal cost; it is strictly positive 
because σ>1. Because of the identical costs and wages, prices of all varieties are identical. Free 
entry of firms causes Pj to fall; profitable market supply for each firm falls. Entry continues 
until each firm breaks even. Equations (3.7) and (3.6) may be combined to find the unique 
equilibrium supply level  *
vij X  for active firms at each export market: 







  (3.8)   17 
The break-even supply level in export markets increases in the degree of policy heterogeneity. 
This is a matter of scale economies. Qualification costs must be borne up-front by exporting 
firms, independent of firm size. Under conditions of policy heterogeneity, national 
(re)qualification costs are specific for that country market. They cannot be sold or exploited 
elsewhere, hence they are sunk costs. In the equilibrium only those firms enter (or remain 
active) whose expected sales are large enough to cover the sunk market-entry costs. This 
implies that  i ij n n £ .  
Though we refrain from modelling which specific firms are in the sub-set nij, the size of this 
sub-set follows endogenously from our model.
11 We start from the equilibrium of total supply 
and demand per country, described by . * = vij
dem
vij X X  After substituting equations (3.4), (3.8) 
and (3.3) -the technicalities of which are presented in Annex 1- we derive the equilibrium 














































  (3.9) 
Note that the size of the destination country (Y) has a positive impact on the number of 
exporting firms. Once having derived *
kj n we can determine total bilateral exports between 
country k and j:  







" = º *
=
* ∑   (3.10) 
Effects of policy heterogeneity 
Since each firm delivers a different service variety, the total number of service varieties in 
country j is reduced by policy heterogeneity. The import composition becomes less diverse. 
What does it imply for the level of bilateral exports? Reduction of policy heterogeneity (hkj) 
increases the number of exporting firms to country j (equation 3.9), but it also reduces the 
break-even export sales per firm (equation 3.8). The question is which of both effects 
dominates. Substituting equations (3.8) and (3.9) and taking the derivative of exports with 
respect to policy heterogeneity costs yields: 
 
11 All firms within a country are identical, but only a subset of firms enters the foreign market. We consider this as the result 
of random selection. Identification of the specific firms in the sub-set nij is beyond our modelling interest in this paper. 
However, firm-growth models by Jovanovic (1982), Evans (1987) and Baldwin (1994) offer promising elements for such 
modelling. Recently, Melitz (2003) has presented a model on export-market entry for firms with varying marginal and fixed 
costs. Due to self-selection only the most productive firms enter the foreign market while the less productive firms only serve 
the home market. The relative magnitude of fixed and variable costs determines the export status of firms. Bernard and 
Jensen (1999) offer supportive empirical evidence for this. Baldwin (2005) shows that less fixed costs of foreign entry 
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  (3.11) 
This equation nicely reveals the two opposite effects of policy heterogeneity. The first term 
within the square brackets shows the impact of larger firm size, while the second term shows 
the effect of policy heterogeneity on the number of firms. Heterogeneity lowers the number of 
exporting firms.  kj w  represents the market share of all firms from country k in country j. If their 
joint market share is sufficiently small relative to the substitution elasticity, less heterogeneity 
in regulation leads to a higher bilateral trade flow:  
0 ) 1 ( 0 < - + <
¶
¶






  (3.12) 
Figure 3.1 plots how different values of the substitution elasticity and country j’s market share 
affect the impact of policy heterogeneity on bilateral exports. For normal values of substitution 
elasticity (σ>1.1) and for low values of ω, a reduction in regulatory heterogeneity already leads 
to higher bilateral exports. 
 
Figure 3.1    Impacts of the substitution elasticity and the market share on bilateral exports 
 
   19 
Conclusions 
Using a fairly standard monopolistic-competition model we show that more policy 
heterogeneity works out negatively on bilateral exports. Policy heterogeneity has two effects on 
the level of bilateral services trade. Firstly, there will be less exporting firms. Secondly, the 
average size of the exporting firms becomes larger because cumulative fixed (and sunk) costs 
for firms increase due to the regulatory heterogeneity. The first effect dominates, so that the 
level of bilateral exports is negatively related to the degree of bilateral policy heterogeneity. 
This model prediction will be subjected to empirical testing.
12  
Policy heterogeneity works out as a non-tariff barrier because it raises the fixed and sunk 
costs of market entry in export markets. Contrary to quasi-tariff NTBs, the policy-heterogeneity 
NTB has no impact on the export price. While the quasi-tariff NTB lowers average firm size, 
policy heterogeneity has the opposite effect. Policy heterogeneity thus implies less diversity of 
imported varieties, less consumer choice, and hence less consumer welfare. This impact on 
consumers effect will be strongest in small countries.  
 
12 Since firm-level data on international services trade are unavailable we assume that country j’’s demand for imported 
services distinguishes product varieties by their country origin.    20 
   21 
4  Quantifying policy heterogeneity 
Policy heterogeneity has many dimensions, and does not easily lend itself for a quantitative 
analysis, let alone in an internationally comparative context. In order to test the predictions from 
our theoretical framework empirically, we had to develop an index for bilateral policy 
heterogeneity.  
We build on the path-breaking work by a team of OECD researchers (Nicoletti, Scarpetta 
and Boylaud 2000). They have identified the important comparison items with respect to 
product-market regulation, and developed indices for international differences in regulatory 
intensity. Their database on international regulation differences is mainly fed by official inputs 
from governments of OECD member states. The OECD International Regulation database is by 
far the most detailed and structured dataset on national differences in product-market 
regulation. It gives information on over 1100 economic policy comparison items for the 
benchmark year 1997.  
We have removed all items that were too industry-specific, too general or irrelevant for 
service markets. In the end, we preserved 183 detailed aspects of product market regulation for 
assessing heterogeneity in economic policies. Most of the remaining items are of a more or less 
general nature, or at least they can be considered as representative (pars pro toto) for a country's 
overall product market regulation approach.
13 
Our index for bilateral regulatory heterogeneity builds upon detailed pair-wise comparisons 
between individual countries for specific aspects of product market regulation, both regarding 
the form and the contents of the regulation. For each item in the cleaned-up database we assess 
whether two countries are identical or not. It yields information of a binary nature: when the 
two countries differ in that particular regulation item we assign a value of 1, and when there is 
no difference we assign the value of 0 to the regulation heterogeneity index. The results per 
item are aggregated for all relevant items per country pair.
14 The value of the composite 
indicator ranges between 1 in case of complete dissimilarity and 0 in case of identical product-
market regulations. Table 4.1 reports the average bilateral policy heterogeneity. It is lowest 
between Denmark and Ireland (0.26) and highest between the UK and Poland (0.70). 
The impact of regulatory heterogeneity on fixed market-entry costs may differ by policy 
area. We have therefore decomposed the overall heterogeneity index into five specific policy 
areas, identified in the OECD regulation database. The five sub-domains of product-market 
regulation are: barriers to competition; administrative barriers for start-ups; regulatory and 
administrative opacity; explicit barriers to trade and investment; and state control.  
Disaggregation allows us to test in which policy areas the international regulatory 
heterogeneity has its largest trade impact on services. The decomposition was done on basis of  
 
13 The data selection procedure is described in Kox, Lejour and Montizaan (2004, Annex I). 
14 Annex 1 describes the index in more formal detail.   22 
 
  Table 4.1      Heterogeneity of product market regulation among EU member states, year 1997/1998 











Finland  France  Ger-
many 




Spain  Czech 
Rep. 
Poland  Hungary 
                                   
Denmark  0.00  0.46  0.40  0.36  0.45  0.39  0.43  0.46  0.38  0.26  0.46  0.40  0.46  0.42  0.53  0.63  0.62 
Greece    0.00  0.42  0.44  0.43  0.36  0.44  0.43  0.41  0.48  0.47  0.39  0.38  0.41  0.43  0.39  0.34 
Sweden      0.00  0.34  0.48  0.39  0.47  0.43  0.39  0.32  0.49  0.32  0.51  0.45  0.48  0.54  0.43 
UK        0.00  0.50  0.40  0.43  0.46  0.37  0.30  0.50  0.40  0.49  0.37  0.57  0.70  0.46 
Austria          0.00  0.50  0.43  0.43  0.46  0.46  0.37  0.40  0.42  0.45  0.45  0.36  0.46 
Belgium-Lux.            0.00  0.38  0.35  0.39  0.43  0.45  0.34  0.42  0.37  0.52  0.50  0.44 
Finland              0.00  0.41  0.41  0.45  0.44  0.32  0.42  0.43  0.45  0.45  0.41 
France                0.00  0.43  0.43  0.37  0.34  0.42  0.48  0.46  0.45  0.45 
Germany                  0.00  0.32  0.43  0.37  0.39  0.40  0.48  0.57  0.48 
Ireland                    0.00  0.49  0.44  0.42  0.40  0.52  0.62  0.55 
Italy                      0.00  0.41  0.44  0.43  0.51  0.40  0.49 
Netherlands                         0.00  0.35  0.41  0.38  0.46  0.35 
Portugal                          0.00  0.44  0.44  0.43  0.39 
Spain                            0.00  0.53  0.53  0.43 
Czech Republic                              0.00  0.36  0.46 
Poland                                0.00  0.38 
Hungary                                  0.00 
 
Country data are corrected for non-response or missing data.   23 
additional information from the OECD regulation database.
15 Table 4.2 shows the relative 
weights. It also indicates how we expect that heterogeneity in policy sub-domains affects 
bilateral trade (expected sign of coefficient). These expectations take into account that exports 
and foreign direct investment (setting up a local production unit) can be substitutes as a form of 
international service supply.  
Table 4.2          Detailed indicators of regulation heterogeneity by sub-domain of product-market regulation 
                          (PMR) 
       
Components of heterogeneity indicator 
and covered policy domains  
Number of 
items in the 
dataset 
Weight as % of total number 
of items for overall PMR 
heterogeneity indicator 
Expected impact of sub-
domain heterogeneity on 
bilateral trade  
       
Regulatory and administrative opacity   13  7.1  negative  
Explicit barriers to trade and investment  14  7.7   not clear 
Other outward barriers 
a)    5  2.7   
  
Administrative burdens on start-ups    45  24.6    positive  
Barriers to competition    61  33.3  negative  
State control   45  24.6  negative  
       
Overall PMR heterogeneity indicator  183  100  negative  
 
a) The policy heterogeneity index for this sub-domain is not used in the regressions because it is only based on five reported items. 
 
Explicit barriers to trade and investment includes for instance quantity restrictions, measures 
that can be expected to have a strong and directly negative impact on bilateral trade. However, 
heterogeneity with regard to this sub-domain may also imply high costs for complying with 
regulatory requirements in investment. If investment is hampered, firms could decide to serve 
the foreign market through exports. Therefore, the overall effect is difficult to predict a priori.  
More heterogeneity in administrative burdens for start-ups could stimulate trade. The 
reason is that administrative burdens make it more difficult for foreign service firms to set up a 
local subsidiary in the other country. The latter increases the relative attractiveness of exporting 
as a way of delivering services to these markets. Hence, a positive impact on bilateral service 
trade might result.  
State control is most important in services that use fixed infrastructures (rail, 
communication, distribution of electricity, water and gas), although there is still little 
international trade in most of these services.  
Regulatory Barriers to competition is an area that is close to the operational functioning of 
service firms, so that we expect a negative impact of heterogeneity in this sub-domain. This also 
applies for Regulatory and administrative opacity. 
 
15 Per comparison item, the OECD has classified to which type of policy area it refers. This classification is based on the 
analytical approach developed in Nicoletti, Scarpetta and Boylaud (2000). The classification distinguishes main policy 
domains and sub-domains in a 4-layered hierarchy.    24   25 
5  Empirical analysis 
The impact of international regulatory heterogeneity on international service trade has been 
investigated in the context of a gravity model. Reminiscent to the gravity law in physics, the 
crux of the gravity trade model is that it predicts bilateral trade from the market size of the 
partner countries, and the distance between them, as a proxy for variable trade costs. The 
gravity model is a multi-purpose work horse for empirical trade theory. Helpman and Krugman 
(1985), and Bergstrand (1989) have shown that the model can be derived from a trade model 
with differentiated goods and monopolistic competition. Deardorff (1998) demonstrated that it 
can also be consistent with the Heckscher-Ohlin trade theory. Recently, Anderson and Van 
Wincoop (2004) have generalised these earlier findings. They show that the gravity model can 
be derived from any trade model obeying three conditions: (a) trade-separability, i.e. the 
allocation of production and consumption is separable from the bilateral allocation of trade 
across countries, imposing separable preferences and technology; (b) the aggregator of product 
varieties is of a CES-type and identical across countries; and (c) the ad-valorem tax equivalents 
of trade costs do not depend on the quantity of trade.
16  
 
The conditions of Anderson and Van Wincoop imply that the gravity equation may follow from 
any kind of demand equation based on an Armington demand structure, including the one we 
used in section 3. Numerous studies have applied the gravity model to total trade or 
manufacturing trade. Nicoletti et al. (2003) is one of the first to apply this analysis to bilateral 
trade in services. 
In our application the basic gravity model is augmented with regulation variables. Nicoletti 
et al. (2003) also includes regulation variables.
17 They find that a higher regulation level in an 
import country has a negative effect on that country's bilateral service trade. Their analysis only 
considers the intensity level -on a scale relative to other OECD countries- of a country's 
product-market regulation. In our opinion this approach only identifies a small part of the 
regulatory trade barriers. As argued before, it is the policy heterogeneity at a more disaggregate 
level that creates the real sunk-cost effects for service exporters. What Nicoletti et al. (2003) 
may have found is that a high level of product market regulation in the import country 
combined with (unobserved) heterogeneity in regulation between the partner countries causes a 
negative trade impact.
18 This conjecture can be checked by including the level and the 
heterogeneity of product-market regulation as explanatory variables. We do this for the home 
and foreign market. This allows us to test for the hypothesis that a low level of regulation in 
home markets has a positive effect on the competitiveness of its service exporters in the world 
market (e.g. Porter 1990).  
 
16 Anderson and Van Wincoop (2004) show that under some conditions the second and third assumption can be relaxed. 
17 Other studies are: Grünfeld and Moxnes (2003), Kimura and Lee (2004), and Lejour and de Paiva Verheijden (2004). 
18 Other differences between our paper and Nicoletti et al. (2003) are in the country coverage (EU versus OECD), period of 
analysis, and the type of bilateral service trade (other commercial services versus total services).    26 
In our specification of the gravity model, bilateral trade in commercial services is explained by 
GDP in the country of origin, GDP in the country of destination, physical distance, language 
distance, and policy variables. The gravity equation that we test reads: 
 
ij k ijk k j i
ij ij j i ij
D D HET BEN PMR
LAN DIS GDP GDP TRD
e b b b b b
b b b b b
+ + + + + +
+ + + + =
∑ 01 9 00 8 7 6 5
4 3 2 1 0 ) ln( ) ln( ) ln( ) ln(
                   (5.1) 
TRD represents the bilateral exports between region i and j. The basic explanatory variables are: 
GDP in the exporting region i, GDP in the importing region j, and geographical distance (DIS) 
and language distance (LAN) between those regions. The level variables are all expressed in 
logarithms. The added policy variables are: PMR represents the level of product-market 
regulation in the country of origin i, and BEN the barriers to entrepreneurship in the country of 
destination j, while HET represents regulation-heterogeneity indicators for each pair of 
countries. The suffix k represents the five sub-domains in regulation heterogeneity (cf. 
section 4). Year dummies for the year 2000 (DOO) and 2001 (DO1) are added to control for 
possible time effects. In some of the regressions we also controlled for country-specific fixed 
effects.   
Data  
We focus on bilateral trade in commercial services, hence disregarding government services. 
Moreover, we exclude transport and tourism because both services trade categories are quite 
special.
19 Transport because it is strongly related to the total volume of goods trade, and is 
subject to particular regulatory regimes quite different from overall product-market regulation 
(e.g. because of environmental externalities). Tourism trade is excluded because in most of this 
trade consumers rather than producers move to the foreign country, and because it to a large 
extent is determined by non-policy factors like climate, weather conditions and cultural 
heritage. Tourism is also subject to relatively few product-market regulations.  
The bilateral services trade data on ‘Other Commercial Services' and ‘Total Services’ are 
from the OECD trade statistics (OECD 2003) for the period 1999-2001. We have focussed on 
the countries that were EU members in that period. Only 9 of these EU countries report bilateral 
trade data.
20 The original data were not made consistent by the OECD. It means that there are 
possibly two reporting sources: the country of origin and the country of destination. Their 
reporting can deviate significantly. For getting a consistent set of bilateral trade data we applied 
the same method as Lejour and de Paiva Verheijden (2004) for selecting the reporting countries 
that across all trading partners have the least bias for over- or underreporting in comparison to 
all trade partners. In case of multiple reporting we choose the data of the most reliable reporting 
 
19 As a control for the robustness of our findings we also have run a regression for total service trade. These findings are 
reported briefly after presenting our main results. 
20 The data for Belgium and Luxembourg are combined.    27 
countries for our dataset. For the EU countries with missing data we took the data as reported 
by their bilateral partners. In this way, we only miss bilateral trade data between the countries 
Denmark, Greece, Ireland, Spain and Sweden. Data for 2000 and 2001 are corrected for 
nominal differences caused by US dollar inflation. 
GDP data are from the World Bank Development Indicators dataset, and distance data from 
CEPII (Gaulier et al. 2003). The language data are based on linguistic differences between 
languages, derived from the place of the language on the language classification tree (Belot and 
Ederveen 2005).  
Data on the relative intensity of product-market regulation are drawn from the OECD 
summary indicators for the relative strictness intensity of each country's product market 
regulation (cf. Nicoletti et al. 2000). We constructed the data on bilateral regulatory 
heterogeneity indicators based upon OECD International Regulation Database for 1997/1998. 
Results 
We test the augmented gravity model by OLS regression, and afterwards apply other estimation 
methods for refinement and for robustness checks. The regression results are summarised in 
Table 5.1, and will be discussed subsequently, starting with the OLS results in the first data 
column. 
The OLS results in table 5.1 show that the estimated coefficients of the basic gravity model are 
significant, have plausible magnitudes and the expected signs. The market size (GDP) 
coefficient for the origin country is higher than the one for the destination country. The 
estimated parameters for physical distance and language distance have about the same size, 
which may be specific for services, because face-to-face communication tends to be more 
important than for trade in goods. The language variable may also pick up non-regulation trade 
barriers such as cultural differences. 
How do the policy variables affect bilateral services trade? The level of product market 
regulation in the origin country (PMR) has a significant negative impact on bilateral trade. This 
is in line with the Porter hypothesis: regulation shields off the home market, and hampers the 
international competitiveness of domestic service providers, thus reducing their export 
possibilities. The regulation level in the destination country (Barriers to entrepreneurship) has 
no significant effect.
21 Three of the indicators for bilateral regulatory heterogeneity are 
statistically significant and have a substantial negative impact on bilateral services trade. The 
areas for which this holds are, in order of importance: Barriers to competition, Explicit barriers 
to trade and investment, and Regulatory and administrative opacity. Bilateral policy 
heterogeneity in two other regulation areas (State control and Administrative barriers for start-
up firms) appear to have no significant impact.   
 
 
21 This does not change if we take an indicator of overall product market regulation for the destination country.   28 
Table 5.1  Regression results: explaining bilateral trade in other commercial services, EU-14 countries, 
1999-2001 
      Estimation method                                                                                        





















+ fixed effects    
           
Ln GDP Origin  0.83*** 
(0.03)    
  0.83*** 
(0.03)     
0.83*** 
(0.04)     
 
Ln GDP Destination  0.67*** 
(0.03)    
0.70*** 
(0.03)    
    0.88*** 
(0.04)     
Ln Distance  - 0.76*** 
(0.07)    
- 0.71*** 
(0.07)    
- 0.82*** 
(0.07)     
- 0.85*** 
(0.09)     
- 0.85*** 
(0.09)     
Language distance  - 0.69*** 
(0.15)     
- 0.68*** 
(0.15)    
- 0.64*** 
(0.15)     
- 0.71*** 
(0.22)     
- 0.71*** 
(0.22)     
Regulation level           
Product market regulation 
Origin 
- 0.33*** 
(0.07)    
  - 0.37*** 
(0.07)     
- 0.34*** 
(0.09)     
 
Barriers for entrepreneurship 
Destination
  
0.08     
(0.05)    
- 0.08     
(0.05)    
    - 0.03     
(0.07)    
           
Regulation heterogeneity           
Heterogeneity, administrative 
     barriers for start ups 
0.07     
(0.26)     
0.27     
(0.25)    
0.30     
(0.25)    
0.35     
(0.36)    
0.35     
(0.36)    
Heterogeneity, barriers to 
     competition 
- 3.67*** 
(0.37)     
- 2.64*** 
(0.39)     
- 3.21*** 
(0.40)     
- 3.10*** 
(0.55)     
- 3.10*** 
(0.55)     
Heterogeneity, regulatory and 
     administrative opacity 
- 0.50*** 
(0.23)     
- 0.78*** 
(0.24)     
- 0.40*     
(0.24)     
- 0.23     
(0.33)    
- 0.23     
(0.33)    
Heterogeneity, state control  - 0.14     
(0.40)    
- 0.00     
(0.40)    
- 0.31     
(0.40)    
  0.74     
(0.58)    
0.74     
(0.58)    
Heterogeneity, barriers to 
     trade and investment 
- 1.31*** 
(0.23)     
- 0.97*** 
(0.25)     
- 0.80*** 
(0.25)      
- 0.86*** 
(0.30)    
- 0.86*** 
(0.30)    
           
Year dummy 2000  0.11     
(0.08)    
0.04      
(0.07)     
0.05     
(0.07)    
0.01     
(0.10)    
0.01     
(0.10)    
Year dummy 2001  0.22*** 
(0.08)     
0.13**  
(0.07)    
0.15*** 
(0.07)    
- 0.01     
(0.10)    
- 0.01     
(0.10)    
Constant  - 5.81*** 
(0.90)     
       








           
Number of observations:  481     481     481     481     481    
Adjusted R-squared  0.85     0.87     0.87     0.70     0.61    
 
a) Absolute value of standard error in brackets. Code: *** =  coefficient  significant at 1% confidence level; **  = coefficient  significant at 
5% confidence level; * = coefficient  significant at 10% confidence level. 
b) Full Information Maximum Likelihood (FIML), applying simultaneous estimation of equations for origin and destination countries. All 
bilateral variables are transformed as deviations from their individual country-wise mean (DM).  Cf. main text.   29 
The dummy for the year 2001 is statistically significant, while the one for the year 2000 is not. 
Separate regressions for the individual years do not show many significant differences in the 
values of the estimated parameters.
22  
We check for the possibility that the coefficients of the explanatory variables pick up the 
effects of unobserved country variables by introducing fixed effects (country dummies) in the 
OLS regressions. The second and third data columns of Table 5.1 represent the regression 
results with fixed effects.
23 The parameter estimates of the significant heterogeneity variables 
become a bit smaller, but the pattern of results is otherwise unchanged. 
After correcting for period effects (time dummies) and country effects (dummies for origin 
and destination country), there is still the possibility that unobserved country-pair effects affect 
the results. An excessive loss of degrees of freedom prevents us from including dummies for all 
country-partner pairs. We solve this by transforming variables as deviations from their mean 
(hence: DM.).
24 For each destination country it focuses on the differences between origin 
countries, and for each origin country it assesses the differences between destination countries. 
In this way two equations for bilateral exports are obtained: an “origin” equation; and a 
“destination" equation. The “origin” equation expresses all variables as deviations from their 
values for the average origin (=export) country. If variable  kj Z  is a bilateral variable of 











            (5.2)  
in which I and J represent the number of countries for origin and destination. If Z represents 
exports from country k to j the transformed variable  kj kZ D  indicates the exports of country k to 
country j in deviation of the average exports to country j. Similarly, the “destination" equation 
expresses bilateral imports and all explanatory variables as deviations from their values for the 











            (5.3) 
After transforming all bilateral variables in this way, we estimate the two equations 
simultaneously by the full-information maximum likelihood (FIML) procedure. The advantage 
 
22 Results are available upon request. Moreover, we have also estimated a panel regression. These effects are similar to the 
ones presented in table 5.1. 
23 Fixed effects or in this case country dummies represent all country-specific heterogeneity that is not captured by the other 
country-specific variables (like GDP and PMR) in the first specification (OLS without fixed effects). The disadvantage is that 
we can not ascribe this heterogeneity to specific economic variables. For analytical reasons it is therefore not attractive to 
combine country dummies for the origin and destination countries in one specification. 
24 It is a “within” fixed-effect estimator (cf. Verbeek 2004). In many cases the within estimator gives identical results as for 
estimating the non-transformed equation with dummies. In this case not, because of the bilateral variables. The method is 
introduced for bilateral trade by Erkel-Rousse and Mirza (2002). They call the method transformed least squares.    30 
of the transformed variables is that the origin-specific unobserved effects are accounted for in 
the origin equation. At the same time we can add explicit country-dummies to take account of 
the unobserved effects for the destination countries. Similarly, in the destination equations the 
destination-specific unobserved effects are accounted for by the transformation, and the origin-
specific unobserved effects are evaluated by adding explicit country-dummies. Additional 
degrees of freedom are gained by assuming that in each of the two equations the incremental 
information provided by the unobserved country-pair effect over the “pure” origin (or 
destination) effect is random, and can be included in the error term.
25 In the origin and 
destination equation we impose identical coefficients for the year dummies, and for those 
variables that express bilateral differences: physical distance, language distance, and regulatory 
heterogeneity.  
The two last columns of Table 5.1 show the FIML regression results with the transformed 
(DM) variables. The coefficients of most variables are comparable to the ones found for OLS 
with fixed effects. The coefficient for physical distance is higher now. The coefficient for 
regulatory heterogeneity in Regulatory and administrative opacity is no longer significant; 
apparently it picked up specific country-pair effects in the OLS regressions. The estimated 
parameters for regulation heterogeneity with respect to the areas Barriers to competition and 
Explicit barriers to trade and investment remain invariably negative and significant. The year 
dummy for 2001 is no longer significant in the FIML estimates. 
 
Summing up, the regression results for bilateral trade in 'other commercial services' are fairly 
stable over various specifications and estimation procedures.
26 A robust result is that inter-
country differences with regard to product-market regulation in the areas of Barriers to 
competition and Explicit barriers to trade and investment have a significant negative impact on 
bilateral service trade. Finally, another firm result is that we consistently find empirical support 
for the Porter hypothesis that a high level of home-market regulation negatively affects the 
international competitiveness of exporters from that country. 
 
As a final robustness check we also test regression equation 5.1 for bilateral trade in total 
services. The results for 'total services' and 'other commercial services' can never be fully 
comparable.
27  However, repeating our analysis for total services makes it possible to compare 
the results with other papers that have applied the gravity model to total international services 
trade. The full regression results for total services trade are presented in Annex 3. Here we 
summarise the differences with the results in table 5.1. The parameter for GDP in the origin 
country is lower, possibly because for countries 'exporting' tourism, the size of their economy is 
 
25 Thus assuming that the deviations of bilateral fixed effects from their means are i.i.d. random terms. 
26 Doing the same regressions with the seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) method did not change the results. 
27 The reason is that total services trade include transport services and tourism services, each accounting for about 25% of 
total services trade. These two elements of services trade are different from other commercial services. This is partly 
because trade in these services is driven by other explanatory variables that are not included in our gravity equation.    31 
less important than their climate and culture. On average differences in language seem to be less 
important. This is in line with Lejour and de Paiva Verheijden (2004) who concluded that 
language differences are not significant for trade in transport services.
28 Like the result in 
Nicoletti et al. (3003) and Kimura and Lee (2004), we find that the estimated coefficient for the 
level of product-market regulation in the destination country (represented by Barriers for 
entrepreneurship) is now statistically significant and has a negative sign. In the OLS 
regressions the same heterogeneity variables are significant as in Table 5.1, but their value is 
about halved. Much of this effects seem to be caused by specific country-pair effects, however, 
since only the heterogeneity with respect to Regulatory and administrative opacity remains 
significant in the FIML regressions. From this remarkable difference we may infer that the 
robust negative trade effect of international policy heterogeneity with regard to Barriers to 
competition is specific for ‘other commercial services’, i.e. for business services, financial 
services, and distribution services.  
 
28 The reason could be that transport services are more standardised than transactions in most other commercial services, 
so that communication is less hampered by language differences.   32 
   33 
6  Conclusions and policy implications 
International differences in product-market regulation affect fixed rather than variable export 
costs. They cause a duplication of fixed qualification and policy-compliance costs for service 
firms that operate across borders. Qualification costs must be borne up-front by exporting firms, 
independent of firm size. Small firms thus are in a relatively disadvantaged position. Under 
conditions of international policy heterogeneity, national (re-)qualification costs are specific for 
each country market. It requires firms to invest in country-specific ‘qualification assets’ that 
cannot be sold or exploited elsewhere, i.e. they form sunk costs. In equilibrium, only those 
service firms whose expected sales are large enough to cover the sunk market-entry costs will 
operate in export markets.  
In the empirical part of our paper we have empirically tested our approach for the bilateral 
service trade among EU member states. We indeed find strong evidence that international 
differences in product-market regulation constitute a robust non-tariff barrier to international 
trade in services, and in particular for ‘other commercial services’ (business services, financial 
services, distribution services).  
Policy implications 
Our results are important from a policy perspective. Governments have two basic mechanisms 
for reducing the costs of regulation heterogeneity for internationally operating firms, namely by 
regulation harmonisation, or by allowing foreign firms to operate under regulatory standards of 
their home country (mutual recognition). Harmonisation of regulation is a very long process, 
and it may not be efficient because countries may have different market preconditions or 
different regulatory preferences. This means that a wider application of the mutual-recognition 
principle may be the most auspicious track.
29  
Reducing regulation heterogeneity could be done by applying more mutual recognition with 
regard to qualification standards for service providers. This indeed is the approach that has been 
chosen by the European Commission in its proposed and much-debated Services Directive. The 
Commission in 2004 launched new policy proposals for the intra-EU service market (EC 2004). 
A major element in the proposed measures is the 'country of origin' principle that allows for 
more mutual recognition of regulatory regimes in the European service markets. A service 
provider that meets the regulatory standards in the member state of origin should no longer be 
confronted by other or additional regulatory requirements in the EU country where the service 
is delivered. Another element in the proposals is that all EU member states are required to set 
up a single point of contact where foreign service firms can fulfil all administrative obligations. 
Finally, the EU proposals aim to eliminate unnecessary and discriminatory regulation such as 
 
29 There may be some intermediary solutions as well. A ‘harmonisation light’ approach could be to apply a common 
architecture in regulation, allowing quantitative (gradual) rather than qualitative regulation differences. Under ‘harmonisation 
light’ fixed qualification costs which a firm incurs in a more lenient country are no longer forfeit when entering an export 
country with a more tough regulation. The only thing happening is that some additional compliance costs come on top of it.   34 
nationality and residence restrictions. The proposals are applicable to a large part of the EU 
services sector, ranging from retail distribution to marketing research, from administration firms 
to certified accountants, from construction to engineering consultants (cf. Kox, Lejour and 
Montizaan 2004). 
We use the regression results of Table 5.1 to calculate the potential effects of the proposed 
EU measures. We first assess how the EU proposals would affect the bilateral regulation 
heterogeneity in the relevant areas of product-market regulation. This is done by close reading 
of the proposals and all 183 policy items that underlie our heterogeneity indices (cf. section 3). 
We quantify for each of the five heterogeneity sub-indicators what impact the proposed 
measures may have on bilateral regulatory heterogeneity, assuming they are integrally adopted 
and implemented.  
Table 6.1 gives the expected change in the indicators for sub-domains of product-market 
regulation. The heterogeneity components Regulatory and administrative opacity and Explicit 
barriers to trade and investment are heavily affected by the EU directive. The heterogeneity 
components Administrative burdens for start-ups and Barriers to competition are moderately 
affected, while the component State control is hardly affected. In the latter case, this is mainly 
due to the fact that network sectors are not included in the EU proposals. 
Table 6.1  Expected impacts of proposed EU measures on intra-EU policy heterogeneity, by sub-domain 
Components of heterogeneity indicator  
and covered policy domains  
Reduction of the components of indicator due to 
implementation EU directive 
a)
 
   
Regulatory and administrative opacity   66 - 77 % 
Explicit barriers to trade and investment  73 - 78 % 
Administrative burdens for start-ups   34 - 46 % 
Barriers to competition   29 - 37 % 
State control   3 -   6 % 
   
Overall PMR heterogeneity indicator  31 - 38 % 
    a)
  Based on detailed item-wise consideration of the match between the proposed EU directive and the 187 specific regulation items 
selected from the OECD database as basis for calculating the heterogeneity indicators. If all items for a sub-domain would be fully 
affected by the EU directive, the expected impact would 100%. If no items are affected, the expected impact is 0%. Because of the 
uncertain impact of the EU directive on some regulatory comparison items - in particular for those items that are partially affected - we 
use a bandwidth indicating a minimum and maximum effect.  Source: Kox, Lejour and Montizaan (2004). 
 
We combine the reduction effects described in Table 6.1 with the regression results for the 
FIML estimators with fixed effects for the country of origin (last column in Table 5.1) as our 
starting point. For every bilateral relation we calculate how the services trade might be changed 
due to the EU proposals. The effect differs for each country pair, because the initial 
heterogeneity in regulation and the change induced by the EU directive varies for each country   35 
pair.
30 We account for uncertainties by combining the uncertainty effects of the parameter 
estimates -using a spread between plus and minus one standard deviation around the estimated 
coefficients- with the bandwidth of the heterogeneity effects in Table 6.1. This results in an 
increase of intra-EU trade in commercial services (OCS, excluding transport and tourism) 
between 30 and about 60 per cent. This represents 11 to 24 per cent of  intra-EU services trade, 
or 2 to 5 per cent of the total intra-EU trade.
31  
The effects are even bigger if the heterogeneity in regulation would be completely 
eliminated. Then commercial services trade could increase by 177% using the estimates for the 
coefficients of heterogeneity indices in the FIML regression (last data column on Table 5.1). An 
identical system of product market regulation - although that may neither be realistic nor 
desirable
32 - could thus almost triple the intra-European trade in commercial services. 
However, this shows the numbers at stake in a trade-off on the issue of maintaining versus 
reducing national differences in product-market regulation. 
We may also look beyond the intra-EU services market. The results are also potentially 
important for a next round in the GATS/WTO negotiations on the liberalisation of international 
service trade. WTO members should perhaps put more emphasis on mutual recognition as an 
important principle in international service trade. 
 
30 Note that exports are estimated in logs. So the new export level equals the old export level (2001) times the exponent of 
the product of the change in heterogeneity and the estimated coefficient. We have calculated this for each country-pair and 
averaged these results to derive the total EU-effect, using the size of bilateral services trade as weight. 
31 We disregard possible effects that might occur in the non-service part of bilateral trade. 
32 The principle of mutual recognition has its limits. Particularly when there are large inter-country differences in institutional 
development and incomes, open international trade in labour-intensive services market may have too much shock effects in 
some segments of the labour markets in developed countries.   36   37 
Annex 1   Derivation number of exporting firms 
This annex derives the equations in Section 3 for the number of exporting firms and the impact 
of less policy heterogeneity on bilateral exports. From equality between demand (3.4) and 
supply (3.8) we derive the number of exporting firms from a given country k: 



































  (A1.1) 
We have also substituted the price index, equation (3.3) in (3.8). After some rewriting we get 
j k p n
Y





























  (A1.2) 
In equation (A1.2) we isolate nkj from the other elements on the RHS by subtracting  s - 1
kj kj p n  
for the other exporting countries and dividing by  s - 1
kj p . As a result we get equation (3.9). 
 
The effect of less regulatory heterogeneity costs on bilateral exports follows from substituting 
equation (3.8) in the equation for exports, (3.10), and taking the derivative using the chain rule.  
j k























  (A1.3) 
If we substitute the derivative of the number of firms (equation (3.10)) with respect to 
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  (A1.4) 
The term between brackets consists of a negative and positive term. The equation can be 
rewritten by substituting the rearranged equation (3.10) to eliminate fixed costs and income. 
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  (A1.5) 
Note that the term between the accolades almost corresponds to the price index to the power 
s - 1 . Rewriting this term and dividing equation (A1.5) by  s - 1
j P  we get equation (3.11).   38   39 
Annex 2    Policy heterogeneity index 
Let there be n independent countries that may observably differ with regard to attribute R. The 
simple bilateral heterogeneity indicator  R
ij h  has the value of zero in case of country similarity, 
and the value of 1 in case of country dissimilarity:  
{ } ( ) n j i for hR
ij ,.., 1 , 0 , 1 Ì " Î   (A2.1) 
The pair-wise comparisons can be gathered in an item dissimilarity matrix, called H
R. The total 
degree of international dissimilarity for regulation item R can be aggregated in a single 






R h HG   (A2.2) 
This indicator increases in the international degree of regulation dissimilarity. We can also 











  (A2.3) 
Country deviancy indicators are dimensionless numbers; they give no information about the 
nature of the heterogeneity itself, nor on the question whether a player is high/low, strict/lenient 
or intensive/extensive with regard to a particular regulation characteristic. A heterogeneity or 
deviancy indicator therefore will always have to be used in combination with a dimensioned 
level indicator.  
So far we considered regulation dissimilarity for a single regulation item. The approach can be 
extended to much more complex and detailed regulation heterogeneity problems, e.g. by 
distinguishing  { } RM R R R m ,... , , 3 2 1 Ì functions in product market regulation that may each be 
dealt with in  { } S s s s s ,... , , 3 2 1 Ì different modes.
34 This magnifies the comparison base to a 
matrix of dimensions n
2m s.  After adapting for the added comparison dimensions the country 











                                         (A2.4) 
 
33 It can also be expressed in relative terms, normalising the indicator for player i with the performance of the median player, 
found after ranking the deviancy indicators for all the n players. 
34 Some of these s modes may be non-existent for particular regulation functions, e.g. because they are of a binary nature 
(yes-no). In the dissimilarity matrix these modes yield zeros.   40   41 
Annex 3    Regression results for Total Services trade  
Dependent variable: Total 



















fixed effects  
           
Gravity variables           
Ln GDP Origin  0.72*** 
(0.03)     
  0.76*** 
(0.03)     
0.73*** 
(0.04)     
 
Ln GDP Destination  0.76*** 
(0.03)     
0.72*** 
(0.03)     
    0.91*** 
(0.03)     
Ln Distance  - 0.83*** 
(0.06)     
- 0.97*** 
(0.06)     
- 0.78*** 
(0.06)     
- 0.81*** 
(0.08)     
- 0.81*** 
(0.08)     
Language distance  - 0.30*** 
(0.13)      
- 0.07       
(0.12)     
- 0.44*** 
(0.12)     
- 0.44*** 
(0.19)     
- 0.44*** 
(0.19)     
           
Regulation level           
Product market regulation 
Origin 
-0.05     
(0.06)    
  - 0.10*   
(0.06)     
- 0.06     
(0.08)    
 
Barriers for entrepreneurship 
Destination
  
-0.04     
(0.05)    
-0.09** 
(0.04)   
    - 0.12** 
(0.06)      
           
Regulation heterogeneity           
Heterogeneity, administrative 
     barriers for start ups 
-0.21     
(0.21)     
- 0.14      
(0.18)     
0.07     
(0.20)    
- 0.03     
(0.31)    
- 0.03     
(0.31)    
Heterogeneity, barriers to 
     competition 
-1.42*** 
(0.32)     
-1.41*** 
(0.32)     
-0.75*** 
(0.33)     
- 0.73     
(0.46)    
- 0.73     
(0.46)    
Heterogeneity, regulatory 
     and administrative opacity 
- 0.78*** 
(0.20)     
- 0.32*    
(0.20)     
-1.26***  
(0.20)     
-1.08*** 
(0.28)     
-1.08*** 
(0.28)     
Heterogeneity, state control  - 0.14     
(0.34)    
- 0.03     
(0.32)    
 0.22     
(0.33)    
0.67     
(0.51)    
0.67     
(0.51)    
Heterogeneity, barriers to 
     trade and investment 
- 0.61*** 
(0.20)     
- 0.81*** 
(0.20)     
 0.05     
(0.21)     
0.03     
(0.26)    
0.03     
(0.26)    
           
Year dummy 2000  0.10      
(0.07)     
0.03      
(0.06)     
0.03     
(0.06)    
0.00     
(0.08)    
0.00     
(0.08)    
Year dummy 2001  0.15*** 
(0.06)     
0.07     
(0.06)    
0.07     
(0.06)    
0.02     
(0.09)    
0.02     
(0.09)    
Constant  -5.21*** 
(0.78)     
       








           
Number of observations  485     485     485     485     485    
Adjusted R-squared  0.86     0.89     0.89     0.69     0.70    
 
a) Absolute value of standard error in brackets. Code: *** =  coefficient  significant at 1% confidence level; **  = coefficient  
significant at 5% confidence level; * = coefficient  significant at 10% confidence level. 
b) Full Information Maximum Likelihood (FIML), simultaneous estimation of equations for origin and destination countries.  
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